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Climate change and critical infrastructure – floods 
Abstract 
This study investigates the change in the level of risk to critical infrastructure due to the impact of climate 
change on the frequency and severity of floods. We implement a case study focused on the power grid to 
demonstrate the methodology. The consideration of the power outage substantially changes the estimated 
losses from the flood scenario. The economic losses due to the interruption of the daily economic activity are 3 
to 5 times greater if the power outage outside the inundated area is taken into consideration. The cost of 
transmission asset repairs far outweighs the daily economic losses, and amounts to 95-98% of the total cost. 
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Executive summary 
Critical infrastructures are the backbone of modern society and provide for many of the 
essential services that serve as the foundation of European economy. The risk environment 
facing critical infrastructure has evolved considerably over the last 20 years. For example, 
climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of hydro-meteorological hazards, 
such as floods and storms, and may warrant a re-prioritization of critical infrastructure 
resilience in government agendas. 
Adaptation to climate change relies on critical infrastructure resilience, and both require a 
better understanding of the hazards critical infrastructures are exposed to. The purpose of 
this study was to develop and present a methodology to investigate the impact of climate 
change on the risk posed by floods to critical infrastructure. More specifically, the study 
objectives were 1) to understand how losses for a current 100-year flood scenario change 
if infrastructure ripple effects outside the inundated area are considered and 2) how climate 
change will affect future risk levels. A case study was conducted in a large urban center in 
Western Europe, focusing on the power grid as a first step. The scope of this study is 
limited to demonstrating the feasibility of the methodology and inductively drawing 
preliminary conclusions regarding the impact of floods on critical infrastructure given 
climate change conditions.  
Our approach combines a future projection of the recurrence interval of selected flood 
scenarios and the assessment of the estimated losses incurred by critical infrastructure 
and resulting from the disruption of daily economic activity. The projected probability of a 
current 100-year flood scenario in the case study area was derived from the pan-European 
flood risk assessment under high-end climate scenarios conducted by the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre. Ensemble projections indicate that flood hazard may 
increase in the study area, yet there is considerable climate uncertainty around these 
central estimates. To cover the range of possible future flood hazard conditions, we tested 
different climate change scenarios to understand the sensitivity of the study to different 
climate model outcomes. 
Flood hazard scenarios were analyzed using JRC’s Flood Hazard Maps. The analysis 
included the potential damage to critical electric infrastructure facilities and assets, and 
the losses resulting from the disruption of the daily economic activity in the area affected 
by the power outage caused by the inundation or preemptive shut down of the electric 
substations located in the inundation zone. This area can be larger than the inundation 
zone. 
For the selected case-study region, the application of the presented methodology showed 
that, despite their low severity, floods with a low return period yield the highest level of 
economic risk. In addition, the economic losses due to the interruption of the daily 
economic activity are 3 to 5 times greater if the power outage is taken into consideration 
than if only the area affected by the flood is taken into account. In addition, the cost of 
transmission asset repairs far outweighs the daily economic losses due to service 
interruption, and amounts to 95-98% of the total cost. Damage to transmission lines 
accounts for a minor fraction, while substation damage takes the lion’s share. The total 
economic impact of the flood and power outage combined for the 100-year flood is more 
than double that of the 10-year scenario. The reason for the increase is mostly the 
inundation of far more substations in the 100-year scenario than in the 10-year scenario. 
On the other hand, the total economic cost increases by only about 10% between the 100-
year and 200-year scenario. The increase is due to the combination of greater water depths 
at all power grid assets and a slightly wider area affected by the flood. 
The methodology can be readily extended to other critical infrastructure sectors, provided 
the availability of depth-damage functions. It may also be extended to other hazards, as 
long as there exist statistical correlations between the intensity of the hazard and the level 
of damage. For example, fragility functions are available for earthquakes and hurricanes. 
Possibilities for future research include the improvement of depth-damage functions. 
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1 Introduction 
Critical infrastructures are the backbone of modern society and provide for many of the 
essential services that serve as the foundation of European economy. They include systems 
or assets which are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, 
security, and economic or social well-being of people1. The safety and security of critical 
infrastructure is an indispensable prerequisite for community resilience. The disruption of 
critical infrastructure may be caused by natural hazards, technological accidents, malicious 
attacks or other causes. Although it is unlikely that it may result in widespread death or 
injury, the loss of critical infrastructure systems can debilitate the economy, health and 
security of a community or nation. Damage to critical infrastructure systems caused by 
natural hazards may slow down response and recovery, and increase the cost of 
reconstruction. 
The risk environment facing critical infrastructure has evolved considerably over the last 
20 years. Initially directed predominantly at natural hazards, the focus of critical 
infrastructure protection has progressively shifted to new threats, such as terrorist attacks, 
including the possibility of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear-Explosive (CBRNE) agents, as well as cyber risks. 
However, climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of hydro-meteorological 
hazards and may warrant a re-prioritization of critical infrastructure resilience in 
government agendas. Recent studies (Forzieri et al., 2017) have pointed out that the 
impact of climate change on critical infrastructure may increase substantially in the coming 
decades. 
Adaptation to climate change relies on critical infrastructure resilience, and both require a 
better understanding of the risk environment facing critical infrastructure. The purpose of 
this study was to develop and present a methodology to investigate the impact of climate 
change on the risk posed by floods to critical infrastructure. Climate change is expected to 
increase the frequency and severity of floods throughout Europe (Alfieri et al., 2015a). Our 
approach combines a future projection of the recurrence interval of selected flood scenarios 
and the assessment of the estimated losses incurred to critical infrastructure and resulting 
from the disruption of daily economic activity. 
A case study was conducted to demonstrate the methodology in a large urban area in 
Western Europe, focusing on critical electric infrastructure as a first step. The scope of this 
study is limited to demonstrating the feasibility of the methodology and inductively drawing 
preliminary conclusions regarding the impact of floods on critical infrastructure given 
climate change conditions. It is not intended to supplement, replace or challenge existing 
risk assessment and management plans prepared by Member States. Among all critical 
infrastructure sectors, electric power is a cornerstone of modern economies. Electricity is 
ubiquitous in the daily lives of European citizens and spans across all sectors of the 
European economy. In addition, all critical infrastructure systems depend, to a greater or 
lesser extent, on the reliable delivery of electricity. Long-term power outages can slow 
down disaster recovery efforts and severely disrupt the economy of affected communities 
(Petermann et al., 2011; Karagiannis et al., 2017). 
This report is structured in six chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the European policies regarding 
electric power supply security, the impact of floods on critical electric infrastructure and 
current knowledge about the impact of climate change on floods. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology, while chapter 4 presents the results of the case study. Chapter 5 is a 
discussion of the results, focusing on the implications for flood risk management, the 
limitations, as well as the possibility for extending the methodology. Last, chapter 6 
summarizes our findings. 
                                           
(1) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345/75, 23.12.2008, p. 75-
82). 
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2 Climate change, floods and critical electric infrastructure 
Floods affect more people than any other hazard in Europe. 30 out of the 34 countries 
participating in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) have included floods in their 
national risk assessment. Riverine floods are mostly prevalent in Central, Eastern and 
Northern European Countries, while flash floods are common in Southern European 
countries. Climate change is expected to change pattern of floods in Europe. The frequency 
and severity of floods is expected to rise in most countries, but would also decrease in 
some. Of the 30 Member States which have included flood scenarios in their NRAs, 10 have 
considered that floods may disrupt critical infrastructure. In addition to the loss of critical 
infrastructure as a secondary effect of identified hazards and threats, 20 NRAs include 
scenarios of long-term power outage (EC, 2017; Krausmann et al., 2016). 
In recent years, the losses from floods in Europe have increased considerably, due to an 
increase of the economic activity in flood zones and of heavy rainfall in parts of Europe 
(EEA, 2016). The electric power grid is particularly vulnerable to floods, and power outages 
are a frequent consequence of severe floods (Karagiannis et al., 2017). This chapter briefly 
outlines the policy and regulatory framework regarding electricity, floods and climate 
change in the European Union, the impact of floods on critical electric infrastructure and 
the likely effects of climate change on the frequency and severity of floods in Europe. 
2.1 Policy and regulation 
2.1.1 Electricity 
Electricity critical infrastructure assets and facilities are owned by public and private 
entities. The electric power subsector faces a paradigm change to a much more horizontal 
system where end-consumers will play a much more active role, in accordance with the EC 
energy policy as expressed in the Clean Energy Package for all Europeans. 
At the EU level, electricity risk reduction and crisis management are scattered over different 
legal acts. At the pan-European level, the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) produces seasonal outlooks according to the 
requirements of Article 8 of the Electricity Regulation2. These outlooks explore the main 
risks identified, but are mainly focused on generation adequacy and do not fully account 
for floods or other natural hazards.  At the Member State level, risk preparedness is only 
implicitly set in Article 4 of the Electricity Directive3 and Article 7 of the Security of Supply 
(SoS) Directive4 which impose the general obligation to Member States to monitor security 
of supply and to publish every two years a report outlining their findings, as well as any 
measures taken or envisaged to address them. The success, especially in terms of 
harmonization, of the above legal frameworks is rather debatable (Karagiannis et al., 
2017). 
Risk preparedness in the Internal Energy Market is an ongoing regulatory effort. Three 
network codes are of main importance on the subject: the CACM Guideline5, the SO 
                                           
(2) Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 
(OJ L 51/15, 14.8.2009, p. 15-35). 
(3) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ L 211/55, 14.8.2009, p. 
55-93). 
(4) Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2006 concerning measures 
to safeguard security of electricity supply and infrastructure investment (OJ L 33/22, 4.2.2006, p. 22-27). 
(5) Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management (OJ L 197/24, 25.7.2015, p. 24-72). 
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Guideline6, both already in force, and the Network Code on Emergency & Restoration7, still 
in Comitology. Even though these network codes contribute to the creation of a harmonized 
framework for assessing security of supply and coordinate remedial actions in both 
emergency and system recovery situations, they still address risks mainly within the 
context of generation adequacy, and are not a full vulnerability analysis. The European 
Commission has proposed a Regulation on risk-preparedness8 to address the regulatory 
gap in the context of the Clean Energy for all Europeans package. The Regulation aims for 
the creation of a general legislative framework for the prevention, preparation for and 
management of electricity crisis situations (Karagiannis et al., 2017). 
2.1.2 Disaster risk management 
Several policy areas related to disaster risk management address, directly or indirectly, 
the resilience of the power grid against floods and other natural hazards. First, National 
Risk Assessments, required by Article 6 of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism Decision9, 
should consider the impact of hazards on critical infrastructure. The Floods Directive10 
requires Member States to develop flood-specific risk analyses taking into account 
scenarios with different return periods. The Water Framework Directive11 advances the 
protection of water resources as a mitigation measure against floods and droughts. The 
Seveso III Directive12 explicitly compels industrial facility operators to consider natural 
hazards as initiating events in the analysis of the risk from hazardous materials releases. 
The European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) Directive13, focusing on energy and transport, 
explicitly requires Member States to designate ECIs based on the potential impact of the 
disruption of critical infrastructure systems, expressed in terms of casualties, and economic 
and public effects. 
2.1.3 Climate change 
Energy is at the center of the EU’s climate action. Critical infrastructure resilience against 
natural hazards is one of the three objectives of the EU Adaptation Strategy14. Hydro-
meteorological hazards (such as floods and storms) cause direct damage to transmission 
and distribution networks. Older regional distribution grids are particularly vulnerable to 
natural hazards. Floods can also adversely affect electricity generation capabilities. The 
power grid is also likely to be challenged from changing demand patterns (EC, 2011). 
Resilience can be built into infrastructure by designing new facilities and assets with future 
climate hazards in mind and by retrofitting existing assets to withstand increased forces or 
                                           
(6) Draft Commission Regulation establishing a guideline on electricity transmission system operation (final), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/SystemOperationGuideline%20final%28provisional
%2904052016.pdf (accessed July 14, 2017) 
(7) Draft Commission Regulation establishing a network code on electricity emergency and restoration (final), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/nc_er_ener_vs_13_ecbc_on_24_25-10-
2016finalasvotedfor_publication.pdf (accessed July 14, 2017) 
(8) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on risk-preparedness in the electricity 
sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC (COM/2016/0862 final – 2016/0377 COD), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1d8d2670-b7b2-11e6-9e3c-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed July 14, 2017) 
(9) Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347/924, 20.12.2013, p. 924–947) 
(10) Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment 
and management of flood risks (OJ L 288/27, 6.11.2007, p. 27–34) 
(11) Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327/1, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73) 
(12) Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 
96/82/EC (OJ L 197/1, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37) 
(13) Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345/75, 23.12.2008, p. 75-
82) 
(14) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change 
(COM/2013/0216 final), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0216 
(accessed December 1, 2017) 
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more frequent occurrences of natural hazards. Climate projections need to be used to guide 
analyses of the vulnerability of interconnected grids to the estimated levels of hazards. 
These assessments should then be used to craft and execute cross-disciplinary strategies, 
combining land use, engineering and organizational measures (EC, 2013). 
2.2 Impact of floods on critical electric infrastructure 
Floods cause widespread damage to the power grid assets and are commonly associated 
with power outages. In a recent study of 20 floods caused by heavy rainfall or hurricanes, 
electricity was interrupted in 100% of the cases. Power was restored progressively, with 
the blackout generally lasting from less than 24 hours to one week. Hurricanes were 
associated with longer blackouts which exceeded one month, but the fraction of the 
damage caused by floodwaters was difficult to determine (Karagiannis et al., 2017). The 
following sections outline how floods affect electricity infrastructure, flood mitigation 
options for electric utilities and courses of action for emergency response. 
2.2.1 Flood damage and mitigation 
Floods affect all assets which come into contact with water. Inundated equipment can fail 
catastrophically if under tension. In addition, large quantities of water and mud may be 
trapped in inundated circuit breakers, transformer parts, control house equipment, and 
metallic switchgear, requiring delicate, costly and time-consuming cleanup and repairs. 
The level of damage, and therefore the cost and duration of required repairs has been 
found to increase with the water depth and the duration of the inundation (Karagiannis et 
al., 2017). 
Because of their ubiquity and high concentration of sensitive equipment, substations are 
at increased risk from floods. It is generally accepted that the restoration of a flooded 
substation takes much longer than the repair of a downed power line damaged by ice or 
wind (Abi-Samra, 2010). Flood mitigation strategies, such as locating the substation above 
projected flood levels, levee protection and elevating critical equipment, have been 
effective in reducing the damage to critical substation equipment (Karagiannis et al., 
2017). Burying distribution substations has been considered as a hazard mitigation 
measure in urban areas, but has proven to be costly, time-consuming and ineffective. Abi-
Samra (2013) reports that underground assets have been washed away during hurricanes 
and are reportedly prone to frequent flooding. 
Buoyancy, hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads, and debris impact typically contribute to 
flood-generated structural damage to technological systems (Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Transmission towers are more vulnerable to this type of damage than substations. 
Landslides and soil erosion secondary to floods or heavy rainfall may severely undermine 
the foundations of transmission towers. On the other hand, structural damage is limited 
and not critical to the duration of the power outage (Karagiannis et al., 2017). 
2.2.2 Emergency response 
Because of the devastating effects of water intrusion to electrified substation equipment, 
preemptively shutting down power to vulnerable substations located in the flood zone is a 
very popular course of action with electric utilities facing an imminent flood (Karagiannis 
et al., 2017). Its advantage is that it prevents the catastrophic, often explosive, damage 
caused when water comes into contact with live equipment. 
The drawback of this course of action is that is results in longer blackouts extending over 
wider areas. Because substations typically serve the area surrounding them in all 
directions, when a substation is shut down, the outage may extend to areas otherwise 
unaffected by the flood. In a few rare instances, substations have been preemptively shut 
down, but ended up not being inundated. Furthermore, many areas may be without power 
longer than being underwater, especially if the river spills over from its banks onto the 
adjacent floodplain. In this case, substations are typically inundated before the area they 
service is entirely under water. As floodwaters recede, substations may remain immersed 
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while part of the area they service is no longer inundated. On the other hand, if the river 
overflow is associated with a sharp rise of the aquifer, which is a typical case in floods 
occurring over permeable soils and/or caused by heavy rainfall, the substation may be 
inundated more or less simultaneously with the surrounding area. 
Despite causing blackouts that last longer and extend over a larger area, the preemptive 
shut down strategy is effective because it prevents catastrophic damage and therefore 
shortens the repair time. However, even with the preventive shut down, the time needed 
to conduct delicate repairs may prolong the blackout. Sensitive inundated equipment will 
have to be disassembled and cleaned, while some items may be damaged beyond repair. 
In addition, many types of repairs cannot start until the waters recede, adding further to 
the duration of the power outage for many areas. Repairs may also be delayed because of 
poor access to affected substations and transmission towers, resulting from inundated 
roads, railway tracks and bridges, as well as traffic congestion. Last, telecommunications 
outages, either due to inundation of equipment or secondary to the power blackout, can 
also prolong the recovery phase (Karagiannis et al., 2017). 
2.3 Impact of climate change on the flood hazard in Europe 
A pan-European flood hazard assessment by Alfieri et al. (2015b) indicates that extreme 
river flows are projected to rise significantly in most of Europe. This is shown in Table 1 
that reports the results of the frequency analysis of extreme peak flow events above a 
100-year return period (referred to as f100), aggregated at country level. The predominance 
of positive changes in f100 means that in all countries there will be an increase in frequency 
of severe flood events. Such an analysis is of particular interest, given that the average 
protection level of the European river network is of the same magnitude (Rojas et al., 
2013), with some obvious differences among different countries and river basins (Jongman 
et al., 2014). In other words, a substantial increase in the frequency of peak flows below 
the protection level is likely to have a lower impact, in terms of critical infrastructures 
potentially affected and economic losses, in comparison to a small but significant change 
in extreme events overtopping protection structures and causing settled areas to be 
inundated by the flood flow. Values shown in Table 1 were obtained by counting the 
average frequency of occurrence in all grid points of the river network within each country. 
The statistical significance of the estimated change in the ensemble mean was tested with 
a two-proportion z test. A stringent p value of 1‰ is chosen as threshold for significance, 
to compensate for the autocorrelation of extreme events in neighbouring grid points along 
the drainage direction. In addition, this issue is mitigated by the use of an ensemble of 
seven independent climate projections. Note that no flood hazard was computed for Cyprus 
and Malta because the river network in these countries is below the minimum threshold 
considered in the analysis. 
Table 1. Mean annual exceedance frequency of the 100-year return period peak flow for different 
European countries and percentage change between the baseline and the future time slices (1). 
Country  
f100 Δf100 
baseline 2021-2050 2071-2100 2021-2050 2071-2100 
Austria 0.0067 0.0223 0.0316 231% 369% 
Belgium 0.0102 0.0344 0.0519 235% 407% 
Belarus 0.0083 0.0152 0.0157 83% 90% 
Bosnia - Herzegovina 0.0096 0.0211 0.0302 121% 216% 
Bulgaria 0.0159 0.0292 0.0324 84% 104% 
Croatia 0.0062 0.0165 0.0267 165% 328% 
Cyprus 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0% 0% 
Czech Republic 0.0140 0.0199 0.0246 42% 76% 
Denmark 0.0179 0.0228 0.0377 28% 111% 
Estonia 0.0025 0.0069 0.0118 179% 379% 
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Finland 0.0031 0.0030 0.0034 -4% 11% 
France 0.0094 0.0235 0.0334 150% 256% 
FYROM 0.0120 0.0204 0.0464 69% 285% 
Germany 0.0115 0.0235 0.0282 105% 146% 
Greece 0.0113 0.0242 0.0410 113% 262% 
Hungary 0.0087 0.0222 0.0236 153% 170% 
Ireland 0.0086 0.0211 0.0494 147% 477% 
Iceland 0.0020 0.0100 0.0235 390% 1050% 
Italy 0.0126 0.0241 0.0483 92% 284% 
Kosovo 0.0088 0.0443 0.0512 405% 484% 
Lithuania 0.0078 0.0131 0.0122 66% 55% 
Luxemburg 0.0058 0.0201 0.0194 247% 235% 
Latvia 0.0054 0.0163 0.0192 202% 255% 
Malta 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0% 0% 
Moldova 0.0203 0.0402 0.0310 98% 53% 
Montenegro 0.0089 0.0200 0.0388 125% 335% 
The Netherlands 0.0090 0.0358 0.0511 296% 465% 
Norway 0.0027 0.0086 0.0091 215% 233% 
Poland 0.0125 0.0268 0.0261 114% 109% 
Portugal 0.0074 0.0115 0.0237 55% 220% 
Romania 0.0088 0.0224 0.0266 154% 201% 
Serbia 0.0091 0.0275 0.0374 203% 313% 
Slovenia 0.0061 0.0230 0.0365 279% 501% 
Slovakia 0.0050 0.0153 0.0144 206% 190% 
Sweden 0.0029 0.0062 0.0093 118% 224% 
Spain 0.0090 0.0185 0.0286 106% 218% 
Switzerland 0.0036 0.0122 0.0223 238% 517% 
United Kingdom 0.0120 0.0216 0.0410 81% 242% 
Europe 0.0080 0.0204 0.0320 113% 234% 
(1) Changes in italic are not significant at 1‰. 
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3 Methodology 
This study estimates the change in the level of risk posed to critical infrastructure resulting 
from the impact of climate change on the frequency of floods in a selected area in Europe. 
Disaster risk results from the probability of occurrence of a flood and the severity of the 
event. The probability may be expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively, depending 
on the level of knowledge available about each hazard. The severity is expressed in terms 
of the expected deaths and injuries, damage to property, disruption of critical 
infrastructure, and social consequences (Agius et al., 2017). The scenario-based approach 
is a popular disaster risk analysis methodology and is highly appropriate for the analysis 
of hazards for which detailed statistical information is available. Here, the change in the 
level of risk in this study is estimated by the change in the probability and the severity of 
floods (Figure 1). 
3.1 Probability of occurrence 
The probability of occurrence of a flood scenario is quantified by its recurrence interval15. 
Although several disaster risk studies typically analyze several flood scenarios, the 100-
year flood is the standard reference in hazard mitigation and emergency planning. 
Climate change is expected to change the frequency of floods in Europe. For any given 
river, the probability of occurrence of what is currently the 100-year flood could be 
increased or decreased. Using the statistical and quantitative analysis approach discussed 
in Alfieri et al. (2015a), we derive the return period of the baseline 100-year flood in three 
future time slices, i.e. 2020, 2050 and 2080, based on the EURO-CORDEX climate 
scenarios. 
3.2 Loss estimation 
Each scenario is analyzed to determine the consequences of the flood on the affected 
communities. The potential losses are a function of the intensity of the hazard (in this case, 
the water depth and the duration of the incident) and the exposure of people and economic 
activities to that hazard. Because the objective of this study is to determine the impact on 
critical infrastructure, the loss estimation focuses primarily on the economic losses 
resulting from the damage incurred to electric utilities in the affected area. The approach 
is illustrated on the left side of Figure 2 and further detailed in section 3.2.1. 
In addition, we estimate the impact to the local economy resulting from the 
combination of the preemptive shutdown of substations located in the flood zone 
and the time required to conduct repairs once the flood has subsided. The process 
is illustrated on the right side of Figure 1 and detailed in section 3.2.2. 
The underlying assumption is that the power outage associated with the flood does 
not cause additional casualties, injuries, or loss of property. This is likely to be an 
underestimation, because a prolonged power outage is expected to undermine 
disaster response capabilities, disrupt healthcare facilities, render heating and air-
conditioning systems inoperable, generate traffic jams and contribute to traffic 
accidents (Petermann et al., 2011; Karagiannis et al., 2017). However, existing 
methodologies cannot grasp the secondary effects of power outages, as these 
depend to a large extent on additional parameters, such as local climate and 
weather, prior disaster response capabilities, and public health before the flood. 
                                           
(15) The recurrence interval is an estimate of the likelihood of occurrence of an event. It is defined as the average 
number of years between floods of a certain size. The actual number of years between floods of any given 
size varies a lot. A common misconception about the 100-year flood is that it is likely to happen only once in 
100 years. In reality, a 100-year flood is the flood which has a 1% annual exceedance probability, that is, a 
1% chance of occurring every year. In other words, it is possible for the 100-year flood to occur two or more 
times per year. 
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Figure 1. Concept diagram of the change in risk level 
 
Figure 2. Loss estimation approach 
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3.2.1 Losses to critical electric infrastructure 
The cost incurred by the damage to inundated power grid assets is estimated by the 
projected flood depth combined with appropriate damage functions (Figure 2, left side). 
First, we determine the exposure of power grid components to flood hazards. Flood hazard 
maps are combined with geospatial data layers of the transmission grid to derive the 
components of the power grid (power plants, substations, transmission towers and lines) 
located in the inundation zone. This exercise also determines the flood depth to which each 
of these facilities or structures are exposed. It is assumed that warning of the impending 
flood is received early enough for the TSO and/or electric utility to switch off power to the 
unprotected power plants and substations located in the inundation zone. 
The exposure geospatial data layer is combined with depth-damage functions to derive the 
cost of repairs of the inundated components. Mean damage functions relate the hazard 
intensity (in this case, water depth) to the mean damage ratio of a facility or asset, which 
is expressed as the expected value of the ratio between an asset’s repair cost over its 
replacement value (Mahdyiar and Porter, 2005; Dutta, Herath & Musiake, 2006): 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑀𝐷𝑅) = 𝐸 [
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
] 
The MDR is expressed as a percentage of the replacement value and can theoretically be 
greater than 1, because the repair cost of a severely damaged facility or asset may exceed 
its replacement value. The exposed facilities and assets are grouped in several categories 
based on their type and similarities in expected loss (Scawthorn et al., 2006). Damage to 
each category of equipment is estimated with a separate damage function. Therefore, the 
total damage is derived from the water depth and replacement value of each facility or 
asset: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝑅𝐶) = ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗) ∙ 𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
where: 
● i = 1, 2, …, n : facilities or assets belonging to each category 
● j = 1, 2, …, m : categories of facilities or assets 
● RVij: replacement value of each facility or asset i (of each category j) 
● xij: water depth at each facility i (of each category j) 
● fj(xij): depth-damage function of facility or asset category. 
3.2.2 Impact on the local economy 
The effect of the power outage on the local economy is approximated by the economic 
activity that is interrupted, on a per capita basis (Figure 2, right side). First, we determine 
the number of people affected by the flood and outage together. When a transmission 
substation is switched off, customers connected to that substation will lose power, unless 
the TSO can reroute power from another location. The area affected by the loss of power 
to a transmission substation is approximated by its influence zone, which is derived using 
Voronoi/Thiessen polygons (Sen, 2016; Longley et al., 2015). The combination of the 
affected area with a population density map yields the number of people affected by the 
outage. To this fraction of the jurisdiction’s population, we add the segment in the 
inundated area but outside the area affected by the power outage. 
Voronoi/Thiessen polygons effectively approximate the influence zone of each substation, 
but they come with two disadvantages. First, the influence zone determined by the 
Thiessen polygon may not correspond to the actual area receiving power from the 
substation. In other words, the distribution network may be built in such a way that each 
client does not get power from their nearest substation. Second, the use of Thiessen 
polygons assumes that each client may receive electricity from only one substation. If that 
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substation is shut down, then this client loses power until the substation is brought back 
online. However, each client may be connected to two or more substations, and 
redundancies are often built into the transmission grid (and more often in the distribution 
grid), which allow TSOs to switch to a different source when a substation is shut down. 
The business cost is the sum of the costs incurred by the outage and the flood. The business 
losses from the outage are approximated by the daily economic activity that is interrupted 
(Zimmerman et al., 2005). The outage stops all business in the affected area until power 
is back online. To that we add the cost from the interruption of the daily economic activity 
exposed to the flood but not the power outage. In both cases, costs are estimated on a 
per capita basis: 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐵𝐶) =
𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∙ (𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝑡𝑓 ∙ 𝑃𝑓′)
365 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
 
where: 
● GDP: the Gross Domestic Product of the jurisdiction under review (e.g. a city)16 
● tout: the estimated duration of the outage (in days). 
● Pout: the population affected by the outage. 
● tf: the estimated duration of the flood episode (in days). 
● Pf’: the population in the inundated area but outside the area affected by the power 
outage. 
● Ptot: the jurisdiction’s entire population. 
This formulation is based on three underlying assumptions. The first is that the power 
outage lasts longer than the flood episode itself, therefore the first term in the numerator 
of the Business Cost (BC) formulation is dominated by the duration of the outage and not 
of the flood episode. This is a realistic hypothesis, because electric utility assets located in 
the flood zone are shut down before the flood and they are switched back on after the 
waters have receded. The second assumption is that the duration of the outage is the same 
throughout the affected area. This could be an overestimation, because power is restored 
progressively as repairs are made (Karagiannis et al., 2017). 
The third assumption is that the local economic activity is homogeneously distributed 
throughout the flood affected area. This could be an underestimation or overestimation of 
the business cost, depending on the locus of economic activities. For instance, if business 
is more concentrated near the river, then the estimated business cost will be lower than 
the actual one. On the other hand, if local businesses are located outside the flood zone 
and/or the area affected by the outage, then the estimated cost would constitute an 
overestimation. 
3.2.3 Losses from the flood alone 
The combined impact of the flood and the outage is compared with the estimated losses if 
only the flood was considered. In this case, the economic impact is approximated by the 
interruption of the daily economic activity exposed to the flood (Zimmerman et al., 2005). 
Assuming the inundated area is evacuated for the duration of the flood, all business in that 
area is interrupted. Therefore, the economic cost is estimated on a per capita basis: 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐹𝐶) =
𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∙ 𝑡𝑓 ∙ 𝑃𝑓
365 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
 
where: 
● GDP: the Gross Domestic Product of the jurisdiction under review. 
                                           
(16) If the jurisdiction GDP is not available, it may be estimated by dividing the country’s GDP by its population, 
and then multiplying the result by the population of the jurisdiction under review. 
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● tf: the estimated duration of the flood episode (in days). 
● Pf: the population in the inundated area, estimated by the combination of the area 
with a population density map. 
● Ptot: the jurisdiction’s entire population. 
This formulation is based on two assumptions. The first is that the interruption of daily 
economic activity starts and ends at the same time throughout the entire flood zone. This 
may be partially true, as the entire flood zone may be evacuated before the flood, within 
a few hours or a day. However, economic activity is likely to be progressively restored as 
floodwaters gradually recede. Therefore, this assumption may lead to an overestimation of 
the losses, in the same way as the combined impact of the flood and outage discussed in 
section 3.2.2. The second assumption is the same as in the previous case, that the local 
economic activity is homogeneously distributed throughout the flood affected area. 
We compare the level of economic damage due to the disruption of the daily economic 
activity if the analysis considers the loss from the flood alone, with that which is determined 
by also considering the power outage. It is again assumed that the power outage does not 
cause additional casualties, injuries, or loss of property. 
3.2.4 Combined impact of the flood and outage 
The last step in the loss estimation is the estimation of the combined impact of the flood 
and outage, which is calculated as the sum of the costs to electric utilities and the impact 
to the local economy resulting from the flood and the outage: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝐶) = 𝑇𝑅𝐶 + 𝐵𝐶 
3.3 Change in risk level 
The level of risk is derived as the expected value of the losses incurred from each scenario 
(Hickman & Zahn, 1966): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐸(𝑇𝐶) 
We analyze the change in the level of risk (expressed in terms of the expected economic 
losses) caused by the change (increase or decrease) of the probability of occurrence of the 
100-year flood scenario because of climate change. 
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4 Demonstration of the methodology 
A case study was used to demonstrate the methodology outlined in section 3. A large 
metropolitan area in Europe was used as a case study. The following sections outline how 
the methodology was implemented. Section 4.1 briefly presents the case study site. 
Section 4.2 discusses the change in the probability of occurrence of the 100-year flood 
scenario for the area, which was estimated using the methodology discussed in Alfieri et 
al. (2015a). Section 4.3 describes the impact severity of the flood scenarios, which was 
approximated by the damage to transmission grid assets and the interruption of the daily 
economic activity in the area because of the flood and the power outage. 
4.1 Case study site 
Hazardville (Figure 3) has a population of approximately 1,280,000 and a surface area of 
538 km2. Hazardville is a landlocked area, with no direct access to the sea. It is located at 
the convergence of two navigable rivers. The two rivers converge inside the historic center 
of Hazardville, forming a peninsula, which has become a cultural, commercial and 
administrative part of the city. The topography of Hazardville is relatively flat to the east 
of one river, and most of modern Hazardville sits there. Hazardville has a humid subtropical 
climate. The mean temperature ranges from 3,4oC in January to 22,1oC in July. The 
average annual precipitation is approximately 832 mm, with two peaks in May 
(approximately 91 mm) and October (98,6 mm). Electricity in the country Hazardville is 
located in, is managed in accordance with European and national law.  
Figure 3. Map of Hazardville 
 
Source: JRC. Background: Google Maps®. Hazardville layers: https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/ (accessed 
November 14, 2017) 
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4.2 Probability 
Flood hazard scenarios were analyzed using JRC’s Flood Hazard Maps derived at European 
and global scale (Alfieri et al., 2014; Dottori et al., 2016). These maps have been developed 
using two-dimensional hydrodynamic models and streamflow data from the European Flood 
Awareness System (EFAS) and the Global Flood Awareness System (GloFAS). It is noted 
that these maps may differ from national flood hazard maps, and do not constitute official 
flood hazard maps. The collection includes European and global flood hazard maps for the 
10-year, 20-year, 50-year, 100-year, 200-year and 500-year scenarios. European flood 
hazard maps are available at 100 m resolution, while the global maps are available at 10 
km resolution. In this study, we used the European 10-year (Dottori et al., 2016a), 100-
year (Dottori et al., 2016b) and 200-year (Dottori et al., 2016c) flood maps. 
In Section 2.2 it was described how climate change may affect the flood hazard in Europe, 
based on the analysis of Alfieri et al. (2015a). It shows that in the country Hazardville is 
located in, the frequency of rare events (exemplified by the present 100-year flood) will 
increase with global warming (See Table 1 in Section 2.2). From the pan-European 
assessment of Alfieri et al. (2015a) we derived for 3 future time slots the projected 
recurrence frequency of a present 100-year flood event along the rivers in Hazardville. This 
is illustrated in Figure 4 and Table 2. The flood hazard projections indicate that today’s 
(baseline) 100-year flood would occur more frequently in the future in Hazardville, similar 
to the general trend for the country. There is, however, large climate uncertainty in the 
projected future flood hazard, as can be seen from the range in future recurrence 
frequencies projected by the different EURO-CORDEX climate realizations. For instance, 
the recurrence interval of the baseline 100-year scenario could range from 13 years to 170 
years by 2080 depending on the selected climate model. The spread increases with time 
due to the uncertainty in how climate may develop as time proceeds. 
Figure 4. Recurrence interval of the 100-year flood scenario for Hazardville based on the EURO-
CORDEX climate scenarios 
 
16 
We compare the level of risk (expressed in terms of economic losses) between the baseline 
100-year scenario and the upper and lower extremes of the 2080 projection. Specifically, 
we look at how the level of risk might change if the return period of the present-day 100-
year scenario became 13 years or 170 years. For each case, we assume the same level of 
exposure and hazard intensity as presently. That is, we use the same flood hazard map, 
population density and electricity transmission system layout as today. Because the 
economic losses remain constant, the level of risk changes because of the change in 
probability. In addition, we compare the 13-year and the 170-year 2080 scenarios with 
the present-day scenarios with similar recurrence intervals, for which flood hazard maps 
are available. Specifically, we compare the 2080 13-year scenario with the present-day 
10-year flood and the 2080 170-year scenario with the 200-year flood. Our analysis is not 
limited to the comparison of risk levels, expressed in terms of the expected economic 
losses. We obtain more information on the impact of floods on critical electric infrastructure 
by comparing the severity of each scenario, as well as the contribution of each type of cost 
to the total economic damage. 
Table 2. Recurrence interval of the 100-year flood scenario for Hazardville based on the EURO-
CORDEX climate scenarios 
EURO-CORDEX climate scenarios 
Recurrence interval (in years) of the 
baseline 100-year flood 
 GCM RCM 2020 2050 2080 
R1 EC-EARTH RACMO22E 44,8412 53,5447 125,477 
R2 HadGEM2-ES RCA4 19,3497 33,2637 16,2767 
R3 EC-EARTH RCA4 76,7393 75,7214 156,361 
R4 MPI-ESM-LR REMO2009 26,7913 131,867 60,3699 
R5 MPI-ESM-LR CCLM4-8-17 42,9839 33,0349 68,5358 
R6 MPI-ESM-LR RCA4 16,7636 65,6078 13,0743 
R7 EC-EARTH CCLM4-8-17 48,8822 54,8621 170,658 
Ensemble Mean 39,47874 63,98594 87,25039 
Standard Deviation 20.81643 33,7695 64,29947 
 
4.3 Impacts 
4.3.1 Data and assumptions 
The Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) dataset (JRC & CIESIN, 2017) was used to 
derive population density spatial information. This dataset was developed by the JRC using 
multi-temporal collections of Landsat imagery. Landsat is the longest-running non-military 
Earth-observation program. The collection includes grids of built-up presence and 
population density for 1975, 1990, 2000 and 2015, in resolutions of 250 m and 1 km. In 
this study, the population density layer for 2015 (resolution of 250 m) was used to 
determine the number of people affected by the flood and the power outage. 
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The transmission grid layers were obtained from the Open Data Platform of the case-study 
country’s Transmission System Operator (TSO). RTE’s Open Data Platform includes 
datasets covering a wide range of topics, including consumption, generation, electricity 
trade within Europe, regional electricity reports and others. In this study, we used the 
layers of substations (RTE, 2017a) and transmission lines (RTE (2017b). Figure 5 illustrates 
the transmission lines and substations located in and around the study area. Within the 
boundaries of Hazardville, there are 41 transmission substations (maximum voltages of 
225 and 63 kV) and over 227 km of transmission lines (225 kV and 63 kV). However, there 
are no power plants in Hazardville or in its immediate vicinity. 
Figure 5. Map of transmission assets in and around Hazardville (black lines: transmission lines; 
black dots: transmission substations) 
 
Source: JRC. Background: Google Maps®. Hazardville layers: https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/ (accessed 
November 14, 2017). Transmission grid layers: RTE (2017a; b) 
The damage functions for transmission grid assets (i.e. substations, transmission lines and 
power plants, Figure 6) were obtained from the flood model of HAZUS®-MH (FEMA, 2003; 
Scawthorn et al., 2006a; b). Damage functions are preferable to fragility functions for flood 
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risk analysis because, once a facility is inundated, water damages all the equipment and 
buildings inside. In other words, damage is 100% (FEMA, 2003). Here, depth-damage 
functions were used in conjunction with the flood hazard maps discussed in section 4.2.2 
and the transmission grid layers to determine the level of flood damage to substations and 
transmission lines. The use of these particular functions relies on the assumption that the 
vulnerability of transmission grid assets in the study area are similar to the average values 
in the United States. It is also assumed that substation equipment is placed on the same 
height as in the United States. Specifically, the depth-damage functions included in 
HAZUS®-MH assume that electrical switch gear is located 3 ft (or approximately 0,91 m) 
above ground level (FEMA, 2003). 
Figure 6. HAZUS®-MH depth-damage functions for transmission grid assets 
 
Source: Adapted from FEMA (2003) 
One weakness of these damage functions is that they provide information for water depths 
of up to 10 ft (3,048 m) only. In this study, when the flood water depths exceeded this 
bound, two alternatives were compared. The first alternative was based on the assumption 
that the level of damage cannot exceed the maximum Mean Damage Ratio defined by the 
damage function, even when the water depth is greater than the upper bound of the 
function’s domain. Therefore, when the estimated flood water depth exceeded 10 ft, the 
level of damage was assumed to be equal to the Mean Damage Ratio for 10 ft. In the 
second alternative, we extended the depth-damage function beyond the 10 ft bound. We 
used least squares estimates to fit polynomial and power functions to the depth-damage 
function, which yielded R2 values exceeding 0,99. Because depth-damage functions 
represent statistical estimates, we compared the values of damage estimated derived with 
each approach to analyze the sensitivity of damage to this choice. 
In addition, the damage functions for transmission lines utilized here were built based on 
the assumption that the vulnerability of transmission lines to inundation is low. Damage 
potential includes flooding of the ends of buried lines and the eventuality for barges hitting 
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transmission towers (FEMA, 2003). Yet, transmission towers are known to be vulnerable 
to landslides and soil erosion secondary to floods. The repair of isolated failures of 
transmission tower foundations due to soil erosion will be costly and time-consuming, 
because it will require the replacement of one or more downed transmission towers. Site 
access may be a problem, as floodwaters may block roads and make bridges impassable. 
However, these failures are unlikely to significantly delay the reconnection of electricity 
supply to customers, because workarounds are usually found, such as erecting temporary 
structures until replacement structures are built. On the other hand, landslides are likely 
to affect wider areas and therefore produce more widespread damage (Karagiannis et al., 
2017). Therefore, the damage functions employed in this study probably underestimated 
the level of damage to transmission lines and the fraction of the total economic impact of 
the flood attributed to the repairs of transmission lines. 
Furthermore, typical replacement values of transmission assets in the country in which 
Hazardville is located were identified through a review of the publicly available literature, 
including environmental impact assessments of recent projects. Table 3 outlines the 
replacement values for the categories of transmission grid assets located within the 
boundaries of Hazardville. These figures are intended to be representative for this case 
study, but should not be interpreted in any other context. 
Table 3. Replacement value approximations for transmission grid assets 
Asset type Unit Unit replacement 
value 
225kV substation EA € 9 million 
63kV substation EA € 3 million 
Transmission line km € 900.000 
Source: Adapted from ERDF (2014a; b), and ICF Consulting (2002) 
It was also assumed that none of the transmission grid assets (i.e. substations and 
transmission grid towers) are protected by dikes or levees. Therefore, all transmission grid 
assets are inundated to a water depth equal to the flood water depth indicated by the flood 
hazard map in that point. This is likely to lead to overestimation of the damage, because 
some substations may indeed be protected. In addition, substations are likely to be 
protected to some extent by surrounding structures, especially in European urban areas, 
where building density is relatively high and probably higher than in cities and towns in the 
United States. 
4.3.2 Results 
Table 4 illustrates the assumed duration of the flood episode and the power outage for the 
10-year, 100-year and 200-year scenarios. These assumptions were approximated from 
empirical data discussed in Karagiannis et al. (2017). The evacuation of the affected 
population is assumed to begin at the same time as the power outage. While the affected 
area is under water, the flood episode and the power outage are ongoing concurrently. 
Once the flood waters recede, the flood episode ends and the outage continues for some 
time until the necessary repairs are conducted. These durations are meant as approximate 
average values of the time it takes for clients to have their electricity supply reconnected. 
The progressive recovery of electricity connections of individual clients is not simulated 
here, because average values were deemed adequate for the needs of this study. 
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Table 4. Assumed duration of the flood episode and power outage 
Scenario Flood duration (tf) Outage duration (tout) 
10-year flood 3 days 5 days 
100-year flood 6 days 10 days 
200-year flood 7 days 11 days 
 
The economic losses from the flood and outage combined for each flood scenario are 
indicated in Figure 7. In this case, the mean damage ratio was not allowed to exceed the 
value for 10 ft. The estimated total cost would exceed € 2,000,000 for the 10-year flood, 
€4,500,000 for the 100-year flood and € 5,000,000 for the 200-year flood. The total 
economic impact more than doubles between the 10-year and 100-year scenarios, and 
increases by approximately 13% between the 100-year and 200-year scenarios. 
Substation repairs are the major contributor to the economic impact of the flood and outage 
in all three scenarios, amounting to 86-88% of the total cost. Repairs to transmission lines 
would amount to 8-12% of the total cost. The losses from the disruption of the local 
economic activity represent the smallest part of the total cost, amounting to 2-4% of the 
total damage. The increase of the return period from 10 years to 100 years shows a 
remarkable decrease in the fraction of the total losses attributed to the repair of 
transmission lines (from 12% to 8%, i.e. by 1/3), but doubles the effect of the interruption 
of the daily economic activity on the total cost (i.e. from 2% to 4%). 
Figure 7. Total cost of the flood and outage (damage functions bounded at 10 ft (3,048m)) 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the estimated losses from the flood and outage, if the damage functions 
were not bounded at 10 ft. The estimated total cost follows a similar trend as in the 
previous case. The total losses more than doubles between the 10-year and 100-year 
scenarios, and increases by approximately 10% between the 100-year and 200-year 
scenarios. Substation repairs represent again the lion’s share of the impact of the flood 
and outage in all three scenarios and amount consistently to about 89% of the total cost. 
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Repairs to transmission lines would amount to 6-9% of the total cost. The losses from the 
disruption of the local economic activity still represent the smallest part of the total cost, 
amounting to 3-5% of the total damage. The increase of the return period from 10 years 
to 100 years decreases the fraction of the total losses attributed to the repair of 
transmission lines by 1/3 (i.e. from 9% to 6%), but increases considerably the effect of 
the interruption of the daily economic activity on the total cost (i.e. from 3% to 5%). 
Figure 8. Total cost of the flood and outage (unbounded damage functions) 
 
 
Between the bounded and unbounded damage functions, the total economic losses 
increase by 11% for the 10-year flood, 15% for the 100-year flood and 17,5% for the 200-
year scenario. However, the flood water depth exceeded 3 m in some areas. One substation 
was exposed to water deeper than 5m and several transmission lines were under more 
than 6m of water in the 100-year and 200-year scenarios. Considering that the maximum 
flood depth was greater than the upper bound of the substation damage function range by 
2/3, and more than double the upper bound of the range of the damage function for 
transmission lines, the increase of 11% to 17,5% is reasonable. However, this fluctuation 
indicates that the approximation of economic losses is sensitive to the bounds of damage 
functions. 
The repair cost is proportional to the Mean Damage Ratio (MDR) determined from the 
damage function. Therefore, for the same water depth, unbounded damage functions 
produce greater MDR values and hence greater repair costs. Table 5 illustrates the relative 
increase of the cost of repairs of transmission assets between bounded and unbounded 
damage functions for each of the three scenarios analyzed in this study. The effect of 
extrapolating MDR values beyond the range of damage functions was more pronounced for 
substations than transmission lines. The use of unbounded damage functions increased the 
repair cost for substations by less than 17%, while the cost for transmission lines increased 
by approximately 47% to more than 50%. 
However, the costs for substations and transmission lines follow opposite trends. The repair 
cost of substations increases more as the inundated area becomes larger. That is, the 
increase of the cost to repair substations in the 200-year scenario is greater than for the 
100-year scenario, which is greater than for the 10-year scenario. On the other hand, the 
repair cost of transmission lines does increase with the use of unbounded damage 
functions, but the effect is less pronounced as the inundated area increases in size. That 
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is, the increase of the cost to repair transmission lines in the 200-year scenario is less than 
for the 100-year scenario, which is less than for the 10-year scenario. In summary, 
extrapolating MDR values beyond the range of damage functions increases the estimated 
repair cost for both substations and transmission lines. Yet, as the inundation area becomes 
larger, the effect increases for substations and decreases for transmission lines. 
Table 5. Relative increase of repair costs between bounded and unbounded damage functions  
 10-year 
scenario 
100-year 
scenario 
200-year 
scenario 
Substations 6,9% 13,7% 16,3% 
Transmission lines 53% 47,9% 46,9% 
 
Because it is calculated deterministically, the business cost is not affected by the use of 
unbounded damage functions. On the other hand, the estimated losses from the 
interruption of the daily economic activity rise sharply when the areas affected by the flood 
and the power outage are considered in the analysis. Figure 9 compares the estimated 
losses calculated from the interruption of economic activity for the inundated area alone 
versus that in the area affected by the power outage. The business cost incurred by the 
power outage is between 3 and 6 times that caused by the flood alone. Each substation is 
assumed to provide power to the area around it which is closer than any other substation. 
Therefore, when a substation is shut down, all users in that area experience a blackout. 
The result is that the area affected by the power outage is considerably larger than the 
inundated zone. 
Figure 9. Estimated economic losses from the disruption of daily economic activity from the flood 
alone (orange) and the combined impact of the flood and power outage (blue) 
 
 
For instance, Figure 10 illustrates the areas that would be affected by the outage versus 
the flood zone for the 100-year flood scenario in our example. Under the assumptions 
discussed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, the larger the area affected by the flood or the 
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outage, the more of the local economic activity is interrupted, and the more people would 
not go to work. In addition, the outage would last longer than the flood, because of the 
time needed to conduct repairs to the affected transmission assets. Therefore, the 
interruption of local business operations would last longer in the area affected by the 
outage. 
Figure 10. Areas affected under the 100-year flood. Left: inundated area (black and white color 
gradient indicates water depth). Right: area affected by power outage (grey shade). 
 
Source: JRC. Background: Google Maps®. Hazardville layers: https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/ (accessed 
November 14, 2017). Flood hazard map layers: JRC & CIESIN (2015) 
Furthermore, the size of the flood zone increases as the scenario probability decreases. 
Lower probability scenarios would also result in longer flood episodes and would hence 
result in longer interruption of the areas affected by the flood or the ensuing power outage. 
The increase is more pronounced between the 10-year and 100-year scenario than 
between the 100-year and 200-year scenario. When only the flood-affected area is 
considered, the business cost increase by 87% between the 10-year and 100-year 
scenario, but only by 23% between the 100-year and the 200-year scenario. When both 
the flood and outage are considered, then the estimated cost from the interruption of daily 
economic activity for the 200-year scenario is 10% greater than the 100-year scenario, 
but the estimated losses for the 100-year scenario are more than three times those for the 
10-year scenario. In this case, this sizeable rise can be traced back to the increase of the 
area affected by the power outage. It is estimated that a 100-year flood would cause the 
preemptive shut down of 6 more substations than the 10-year flood. Moreover, the 
duration of the inundation and the resulting electricity outage was estimated to be longer 
for the 100-year flood than for the 10-year flood. In other words, the 100-year scenario 
would affect a larger area for more time, hence the sharp rise of the estimated economic 
losses. On the other hand, the same substations would be preemptively shut down before 
the 100-year and the 200-year flood. Therefore, the small relative increase of the 
estimated losses is due only to the slightly longer duration of the inundation and the power 
outage. 
4.4 Change in the level of risk 
This section discusses the change in the level of risk posed by the 100-year scenario. The 
level of risk is estimated based on the expected economic losses from the flood and the 
power outage it triggers. Figure 11 is a risk chart which illustrates the scenarios analyzed 
in this study (the bounded damage functions were used to determine the risk level). Risk 
charts are used to map risks based on their likelihood of occurrence and their 
24 
consequences. Each scenario is plotted on the chart based on its annual probability of 
occurrence (vertical axis) and its estimated severity, in terms of the estimated total 
economic losses (horizontal axis). The position of each scenario determines its level of risk 
and therefore its priority. High-probability and high-severity scenarios are located at the 
top right corner of the chart, and warrant the highest priority in risk reduction strategies. 
Here, the black dots represent the baseline 10-year, 100-year and 200-year scenarios. 
Figure 11. Change in the level of flood risk to critical electric infrastructure 
 
 
The probability of occurrence is calculated from the return period, assuming a Poisson 
process. The results of our analysis indicate that, in the coming decades, climate change 
will likely change the probability of the present-day (baseline) 100-year flood in the study 
area. The calculations described in section 3.1 were conducted using the methodology 
outlined in Alfieri et al. (2015a). Seven climate change models were used to estimate how 
the return period of the present-day 100-year flood might change by 2080. The results 
indicate that the return period of the present-day 100-year flood could range from 
approximately 13 years (worst-case) to 170 years (best-case) in 2080. These two 
extremes are represented by the blue dots in Figure 10. The severity of these two scenarios 
is the same as that of the present-day 100-yer scenario, because the same flood hazard 
map is used for the analysis. Therefore, on the risk chart, the blue dots are located on a 
vertical line which passes from the baseline 100-year flood (black dot).  
Table 6 illustrates the calculations of the level of risk. Among the baseline scenarios, the 
10-year scenario comes with a highest level of risk, which is the product of the occurrence 
probability and the economic losses, and the 200-year scenario is associated with the 
lowest level of risk. Since the losses are of the same order of magnitude for all scenarios, 
the risk level is dominated by the scenario occurrence probability. The level of risk of the 
100-year flood is 80% greater than that of the 200-year scenario, and the risk from the 
10-year flood is more than four times greater than the one of the 100-year flood. The 
difference between the 2080 best case and the worst-case scenarios is substantial. 
The best-case “climate-change” scenario has a return period of 170 years. Among the 
baseline scenarios for which there exist flood hazard maps, the 200-year flood has the 
closest probability of occurrence to the best-case “climate-change” scenario. In the 
absence of flood hazard maps for a present-day 170-year flood, a comparison between the 
present-day 200-year scenario and the best-case “climate-change” scenario could give an 
indication of the change in the level of risk. The 2080 recurrence interval of the best-case 
scenario is approximately 170 years, i.e. within 30 years of the baseline 200-year flood. 
The severity of the 200-year flood is only 13% greater than that of the best-case 2080 
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scenario (which is the same as the severity of the baseline 100-year scenario). In this case, 
the expected losses are slightly higher for the climate-change scenario. 
Table 6. Risk as expected losses 
Scenario 
Return 
period 
(years) 
Annual 
probability of 
occurrence 
(event/year) 
Losses (€) 
Expected 
losses (€) 
Baseline 10-year flood 10 9,516258E-02 2.148.438,65 204.450,97 
Present-day 100-year 
flood in 2080 (worst-case) 
13 7,363405E-02 4.731.317,94 348.386,11 
Baseline 100-year flood 100 9,950166E-03 4.731.317,94 47.077,40 
Present-day 100-year 
flood in 2080 (best-case) 
170 5,842538E-03 4.731.317,94 27.642,91 
Baseline 200-year flood 200 4,987521E-03 5.234.973,33 26.109,54 
 
Similarly, the worst-case “climate-change” scenario has a return period of 13 years. Among 
the baseline scenarios for which there exist flood hazard maps, the 10-year flood has the 
closest probability of occurrence to the worst-case “climate-change” scenario. In the 
absence of flood hazard maps for a present-day 13-year flood, a comparison between the 
present-day 10-year scenario and the best-case “climate-change” scenario could give an 
indication of the change in the level of risk. The 2080 recurrence interval of the worst-case 
scenario is approximately 13 years, i.e. within 3 years of the baseline 10-year flood. 
However, the severity of the worst-case 2080 scenario is more than twice that of the 
present-day 10-year flood. Therefore, the expected losses for the climate change scenario 
are substantially higher, by 70%. 
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5 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to present a methodology for understanding the change in 
the economic risk level posed by floods to critical infrastructure and to show the application 
of the methodology by means of a case study. We have focused on critical electric 
infrastructure as a first step. In what follows, we first discuss the implications of this study 
for disaster risk assessment and risk reduction strategies. Subsequently, we outline the 
limitations of the case study and implications for future research. We conclude with a 
consideration of the potential for extending the methodology to other types of hazard 
and/or different categories of critical infrastructure. 
5.1 Risk assessment and risk reduction 
This section discusses the implications of this study for disaster risk assessment and risk 
reduction strategies. One of the key objectives of any risk analysis is to inform decision-
making regarding risk reduction measures. However, it is important to point out that this 
study is neither intended to replace nor question official risk assessment exercises or any 
resulting risk reduction measures. Rather, we attempt to inductively reach more 
generalized conclusions pertaining to the nature of disaster risk assessments and strategies 
aiming at building resilience into the power grid. 
More people are affected by the outage caused by the flood than by the flood itself. As 
discussed in section 4.3.2, the impact of the flood on the business cost is between 3 and 
6 times lower than that caused by the combined effects of the flood and ensuing power 
outage. In addition, the cost emanating from the disruption of daily economic activity 
accounts for the smallest part (5% or less in all scenarios). On the other hand, the cost of 
repairs to electricity infrastructure assets exceeds 95% of the total damage. These results 
have implications for disaster risk assessments and for the resilience of critical electric 
infrastructure. 
Flood risk analyses should base their estimates not only on the economic damage resulting 
from the interruption of daily economic activity, but also on the cost of repairs to inundated 
power grid assets. This study shows that including the damage to critical electric 
infrastructure to the estimation of losses from a flood scenario would likely increase the 
estimated severity by up to 20 times. Furthermore, when the potential for a preemptive 
shutdown of exposed substations is taken into consideration, the estimation of the number 
of exposed people increases substantially, which changes the risk scenario altogether. 
Besides the argument in favor of expanding the loss estimation conducted during disaster 
risk assessment exercises to include detailed estimates of power grid damage, the results 
of this study demonstrate the vulnerability of modern economies to critical electric 
infrastructure outage. In this sense, this study justifies the inclusion of long-term power 
outages as separate scenarios in a number of National Risk Assessments, as discussed in 
chapter 2.  
In addition to the implications about the methodology of disaster risk assessments, the 
results of this study highlight the need to reduce the risk posed from floods to critical 
electric infrastructure, especially in light of the potential increase of the frequency and 
severity of floods brought on by climate change. Among the baseline scenarios, the highest 
level of risk (expressed in terms of economic losses) is posed by the most likely floods. 
Despite resulting in a larger inundation zone and greater economic costs, the least likely 
flood scenarios were associated with a relatively low risk level in this study due to a lower 
occurrence probability. Conversely, the repeated damage caused by the 10-year flood, 
albeit minor compared to the 100-year and 200-year scenarios, would result in greater 
expected losses, because of the higher probability of occurrence.  
Reducing the level of the risk posed to critical electric infrastructure from floods would 
entail implementing solutions aimed at reducing the probability of a flood occurring, or at 
reducing the impact of the flood on critical power grid assets, or a combination of the 
above. Approaches based on urban planning (such as changing land use near the river), 
structural protection (such as building levees), or a combination of both (such as increasing 
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the size of the flood fringe) would all be justified in principle, but remain beyond the scope 
of this study. From this study’s perspective, such measures should be undertaken only to 
the extent that they are supported by exhaustive analyses of the level of risk posed from 
the flood, not only to critical electric infrastructure, but to the entire community of 
Hazardville. The long-term cost of risk reduction measures aimed at reducing the 
probability of the flood should be gauged against the expected losses to all critical 
infrastructure sectors and the districts which make up Hazardville. In addition, any 
modification of the floodplain of the two rivers converging in Hazardville should also 
consider the potential effects on communities upstream and downstream of Hazardville. 
Courses of action aimed at reducing the impact of floods on the power grid would likely 
prioritize assets based on the proportion of the total damage that results from their 
inundation during a flood scenario. In this study, substation damage took the lion’s share 
of the total economic cost, accounting for more than 85% of the total damage on all 
scenarios. Therefore, protecting substations is likely to substantially decrease the economic 
damage of the flood. Flood damage occurs when a substation is inundated and, once it is 
inundated, water affects all the equipment and buildings inside. Therefore, substation 
protective measures should be designed to prevent the substation from being inundated, 
or making sure the water does not reach the level of critical equipment. In addition, 
protecting substations from being inundated may eliminate the need for a preemptive shut 
down, thus reducing the number of people experiencing a blackout. 
From a technical point of view, the most popular options for protecting substations from 
floods are relocating the most exposed substations outside the affected area, erecting 
levees and elevating sensitive equipment above the expected flood water depth 
(Karagiannis et al., 2017). Relocating substations is technically complex and will likely be 
the most expensive alternative. The cost of relocating a transmission substation includes 
the acquisition of new land, construction, equipment investments, changing the physical 
configuration of the grid around the substation (e.g. erecting new transmission towers), as 
well as dismantling the old facility. In addition, relocating too many substations may reduce 
the reliability of the power grid, which is crucial to the economic activity of urban areas. 
However, it may be the only solution in some cases and it effectively eliminates the risk. 
For example, a substation in Queensland, Australia suffered no damage from the 2010 
floods because it was located well above the 100-year flood level (Karagiannis et al., 2010). 
Building levees around a substation and/or elevating critical equipment above the expected 
flood water depth may be more cost-effective solutions. Another substation in Queensland, 
Australia was inundated during the 2010 floods, but the water did not reach the height of 
critical equipment, and the area surrounding the substation experienced a blackout of no 
more than 3 hours (Karagiannis et al., 2017). However, both approaches need to consider 
the expected water depth, which increases with the recurrence interval of the flood 
scenario. Planning for too shallow an inundation will only instill a false sense of security. 
Substation levees should be sufficiently high and equipment should be elevated beyond 
the reference flood. This naturally begs the question about the choice of the reference 
flood. 
For this particular case study region, if climate change is not considered, the highest risk 
of expected economic losses to power grid assets is caused by the 10-year scenario. In 
addition, substation damage is responsible for the greatest part of the expected losses. 
Therefore, measures to protect the substations exposed to this flood would likely be the 
most economically viable. On the other hand, if climate change were considered, it is the 
worst-case 2080 scenario which yields the highest expected losses. Therefore, protection 
measures should be targeted at the substations exposed to this scenario, and the reference 
flood should be aligned with that water depth. The 2080 worst-case scenario is none other 
than the present-day 100-year scenario, only with a different return period. In other words, 
the same power grid assets are inundated in the 2080 worst-case scenario as in the 
present-day 100-year flood. In addition, the water-depth of the 2080 worst-case scenario 
is the same as the present-day 100-year flood for each substation. Therefore, if climate 
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change was considered, the reference flood for designing protection measures should be 
the present-day 100-year flood. 
5.2 Limitations 
The scope of this study was to demonstrate a methodology for the estimation of the risk 
posed by floods to critical infrastructure, given the change in flood frequency and severity 
driven by climate change. The limitation in scope was deemed necessary to maintain the 
level of specificity to critical infrastructure and climate change, but it came with several 
limitations, which are outlined below. 
First and foremost, the results of this study are critically dependent on the potential 
uncertainties in the data and the climate models used. Ensemble projections indicate that 
the flood hazard may increase in the study area, yet there is considerable climate 
uncertainty around these central estimates. Even when mean values are considered, the 
return period of the present-day 100-year flood could be as low as 13 years or as high as 
170 years by 2080. In addition, the assumptions about population density in the study 
area, the duration of the flood and the power outage, and the replacement value of 
transmission assets all severely affect the results of this study. For example, an increase 
of the population density by 10%, a single-day increase in the assumed duration of the 
flood episode and resulting power outage, or a 10% increase in the estimated value of 
inundated substations, would each cause the estimated business loss to rise by the same 
percentage in the baseline 100-year scenario. 
Second, the depth-damage functions used in this study were, in some cases, incomplete, 
adding another layer of epistemic uncertainty to our estimations. One issue was that the 
damage functions describing the impact of the flood on substations were bounded at 10 ft 
(3,048 m). Because the estimated flood depths exceeded that limit on several cases, a 
sensitivity analysis was conducted to address the impasse. Two alternatives were 
considered: one where the damage functions were bounded at 10 ft even when the water 
depth exceeded that value, and another where the damage estimations were extrapolated 
beyond the range of the depth-damage function. Another problem was that depth-damage 
functions for transmission lines only accounted for flooding of the ends of buried lines and 
the eventuality for barges hitting transmission towers (FEMA, 2003). However, 
transmission towers may be vulnerable to landslides and soil erosion secondary to floods 
(Karagiannis et al., 2017). In one study we reviewed (Aguet & Ianoz, 2001), transmission 
towers may account for up to 50% of the cost of transmission lines. Hence, not accounting 
for the vulnerability of transmission lines may result in a gross underestimation of the total 
economic damage and of the proportion of the transmission tower repair cost to the total 
cost. 
Third, this methodology does not take into account the interdependencies between the 
power grid and other critical infrastructure. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure to a 
wide range of hazards and threats is notoriously shaped by interdependencies which result 
in failures cascading across many different critical infrastructure categories (Rinaldi et al., 
2001; Pescaroli & Alexander, 2016). In addition, electricity is recognized as the single 
critical infrastructure sector upon which all other depend, to a greater or lesser extent. For 
instance, Karagiannis et al. (2017) have demonstrated that power outages resulting from 
natural disasters, including floods, have disrupted telecommunications and compromised 
the capabilities of emergency services. Not considering the impact of the power outage on 
other critical infrastructure sectors likely resulted in an underestimation of the severity. 
For example, if the estimation included the income losses incurred by the 
telecommunications sector because of the temporary shutdown of some cell arrays due to 
the power outage, then the total cost would arguably have been higher. 
Fourth, this approach does not consider the redundancies built in the transmission grid. 
Electric transmission and distribution grids are known for their high reliability, which is at 
least partially achieved by building redundancies in the network topology. In other words, 
electricity networks are designed so that, if any one circuit fails for whatever reason, power 
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may be rerouted through other circuits with minimal loss of time and energy (Short, 2004; 
Kersting, 2002). Conversely, this study has assumed that, if a substation is shut down, 
either because of contact of sensitive equipment with water or preemptively, then the area 
being served by this substation will automatically experience a blackout. This assumption 
is to a certain extent supported by empirical data (Karagiannis et al., 2017), but it may be 
only partially true. If a part of an area served by a substation can receive power through 
another substation as well, then that part may not experience a blackout if the first 
substation is shut down. Therefore, the assumption that the area surrounding a substation 
experiences a power outage when the substation is affected by the flood may result in an 
overestimation of the damage due to the interruption of daily economic activity. However, 
the proportion of the latter to the total economic cost of the outage is small, therefore the 
effect will be limited. 
Last, the case study area is a large urban center with considerable economic activity. In 
addition, urban areas have far greater population densities than suburban or agricultural 
areas. Therefore, the economic impact of the flood or the outage on the local economy is 
likely to be exaggerated. For instance, in the estimation of the Business Cost (cf. section 
3.2.2), a higher population density will yield a greater number of people inside the influence 
area of either the flood or outage for a large urban center like Hazardville compared with 
an agricultural area (irrespective of whether the influence area is estimated using Thiessen 
polygons or through arguably more accurate data provided by local authorities or a DSO). 
The size of the local economic activity (expressed in terms of GDP/capita/day) will also be 
higher for Hazardville. However, because the proportion of the business cost to the total 
economic cost is small, the effect will be limited. On the other hand, one may argue that a 
large urban center like Hazardville will likely have a higher concentration of transmission 
assets, including substations and transmission lines. Therefore, the exposure of these 
assets to inundation will be greater than in a suburban or an agricultural area. This may 
lead to a substantial exaggeration of the estimated cost, because substation damage 
accounts for a large part of the total damage. Nevertheless, this argument is related to the 
increased vulnerability of urban areas to natural disasters (McClean, 2010), which is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
5.3 Future outlook 
Despite the inherent limitations of this study, the results of the analysis offer a valuable 
insight into the risk to critical infrastructure from floods. Moreover, this study demonstrated 
the use of the methodology discussed in chapter 3, as a first step towards the development 
of a more comprehensive approach. Here, we discuss the possibility for extending the 
methodology used in this study and then we briefly outline the potential for future work. 
The methodology described in chapter 3 can be readily extended to other types of critical 
infrastructure, as long as depth-damage functions are available. As highlighted in section 
5.2, the estimation of the damage will depend to a large extent on the type of depth-
damage function selected. In addition, different assumptions about the disruption of daily 
economic activity will apply for different types of critical infrastructure. In this study, we 
assumed that the daily economic activity is interrupted in the area affected by a power 
outage. Whereas this may be a realistic assumption for electricity, it is not for most other 
types of critical infrastructure. For instance, the local economy would probably slow down, 
but not brought to a halt, if there were no more water or gas, or if government services 
would stop working. However, the disruption of other critical infrastructure, such as 
healthcare or emergency services, would probably have other types of consequences, such 
as increased morbidity and mortality from the flood, but this would have to be assessed 
on a local level based on residual capacity. In either case, the Total Cost (TC) would be 
estimated, similar to section 3.2.4, as the sum of the damage to critical infrastructure 
(Total Repair Cost – TRC) and of the impact to the local economy resulting from the flood 
and the disruption of all critical infrastructure sectors combined (Business Cost – BC): 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝐶) = 𝑇𝑅𝐶 + 𝐵𝐶 
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The Total Repair Cost would include the sum of the damage to each critical infrastructure 
sector (which would be estimated in a similar way as in section 3.2.1): 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝑅𝐶) = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑗𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘) ∙ 𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑙
𝑘=1
 
where: 
● i = 1, 2, …, n : facilities or assets belonging to each category 
● j = 1, 2, …, m : categories of facilities or assets 
● k = 1, 2, …, l : critical infrastructure sectors 
● RVijk: replacement value of each facility or asset i (of each category j of each 
critical infrastructure sector k) 
● xijk: water depth at each facility or asset i (of each category j of each critical 
infrastructure sector k) 
● fj(xij): depth-damage function of facility or asset category of each critical 
infrastructure sector 
For the estimation of the Business Cost (BC), a similar approach as in section 3.2.2 would 
be followed, but the numerator should include additional terms to quantify the cost incurred 
from the slowing down or interruption of the daily economic activity due to the disruption 
of multiple critical infrastructure sectors. Another alternative could be the use of an 
appropriate economic model to account for the indirect social losses (Scawthorn et al., 
2006b), but this would not allow to determine which part of the losses is due to the 
disruption of critical infrastructure. Despite its feasibility, however, this approach would 
not consider the interdependencies among critical infrastructure sectors. 
In a similar fashion, this methodology can be readily extended to other natural hazards, 
provided appropriate statistical correlations exist between the intensity of a hazard and the 
level of damage to critical infrastructure facilities or assets. For instance, fragility functions 
(or curves) are used to quantify the cumulative distribution function of the capacity of 
diverse types of buildings, facilities and assets to earthquakes. In contrast to damage 
functions, fragility functions do not describe the Mean Damage Ratio, but the probability 
of failure under a defined load. The capacity is measured in terms of the Peak Ground 
Acceleration (PGA) for earthquakes (Pitilakis et al., 2014) or wind pressure load for 
hurricanes and storms (FEMA, 2003b). Multiple types of critical infrastructure may be 
assessed for each hazard, as discussed above. However, this approach too would not be 
able to take into account the interdependencies among critical infrastructure sectors. 
Other opportunities for future research include improving the available depth-damage 
functions so that they can account for damage caused by flood depths greater than 10 ft. 
Another possibility for further development is the improvement of depth-damage functions 
to account for additional damage potential, such as the failure of transmission tower 
foundations due to soil erosion and/or landslides. Last, this study was based on damage 
functions developed in the United States, the alignment of which with European critical 
infrastructure assets has yet to be confirmed. Therefore, the development of depth-
damage functions specific to Europe, or the assessment of the degree to which existing 
depth-damage functions are representative of the vulnerability of European critical 
infrastructure would go a long way in improving this and similar studies conducted in the 
future. 
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6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate a methodology to assess the impact of 
climate change on the risk posed by floods to critical infrastructure in Europe. A case study 
was conducted in a large urban center in Western Europe, focusing on the electricity critical 
infrastructure subsector and the potential for economic losses due to floods. We derived 
the projected probability of a present 100-year flood scenario in the case study area from 
the pan-European flood risk assessment under high-end climate scenarios conducted by 
the JRC. Flood hazard scenarios were analyzed using JRC’s Flood Hazard Maps. It was 
assumed that the transmission substations in the inundation zone would be preemptively 
shut down to minimize the level of damage, thus causing a power outage in the areas 
receiving electricity from these substations. The analysis included the potential damage to 
critical electric infrastructure facilities and assets, and the losses resulting from the 
disruption of the daily economic activity in the area affected by the power outage. 
Ensemble projections indicate that the flood hazard may increase in the study area, yet 
there is considerable climate uncertainty around these central estimates. Specifically, 
estimations based on 7 climate change scenarios project the recurrence interval of the 
present 100-year flood from approximately 13 years to 170 years by 2080.  
We found that the economic losses due to the interruption of the daily economic activity 
are 3 to 5 times greater if the power outage is taken into consideration than if only the 
area affected by the flood is taken into account. In addition, the cost of transmission asset 
repairs far outweighs the daily economic losses, and amounts for 95-98% of the total cost. 
Damage to transmission lines accounts for a minor fraction, while substation damage takes 
the lion’s share. The severity of the flood and power outage combined for the 100-year 
flood is more than double that of the 10-year scenario. The reason for the increase is 
mostly the inundation of far more substations in the 100-year scenario than in the 10-year 
scenario. On the other hand, the total economic cost increases by only about 10% between 
the 100-year and 200-year scenario. The increase is due to the combination of greater 
water depths at all power grid assets and a slightly wider area affected by the flood. 
Despite having a low severity, flood scenarios with a low return period yielded the highest 
level of risk (expressed in terms of economic losses) in this case study. In other words, 
the repeated impact of high probability/low severity floods is likely to have more sinister 
consequences than low probability/high severity events. The outcomes of the assessment 
methodology used in this study indicate that substations located in the 10-year inundation 
zone should be given priority in protection works, while the latter should ideally be designed 
to withstand the 100-year flood. 
The methodology can be readily extended to other critical infrastructure sectors, provided 
the availability of depth-damage functions. It may also be extended to other hazards, as 
long as there exist statistical correlations between the intensity of the hazard and the level 
of damage. For example, fragility functions are available for earthquakes and hurricanes. 
In either case, however, it is impossible to account for the interdependencies among critical 
infrastructure sectors. Possibilities for future research include the improvement of depth-
damage functions. These should also be validated for European infrastructure systems, or 
new ones should be developed. 
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